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Abstract—A polar coding scheme is proposed for the
Wiretap Broadcast Channel with two legitimate receivers
and one eavesdropper. We consider a model in which the
transmitter wishes to send a private and a confidential
message that must be reliably decoded by the receivers, and
the confidential message must also be (strongly) secured
from the eavesdropper. The coding scheme aims to use
the optimal rate of randomness and does not make any
assumption regarding the symmetry or degradedness of
the channel. This paper extends previous work on polar
codes for the wiretap channel by proposing a new chaining
construction that allows to reliably and securely send
the same confidential message to two different receivers.
This construction introduces new dependencies between the
random variables involved in the coding scheme that need
to be considered in the secrecy analysis.
Index Terms—Polar codes, information-theoretic secu-
rity, wiretap channel, broadcast channel, strong secrecy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information-theoretic security over noisy channels was
introduced by Wyner in [1], which characterized the
secrecy-capacity of the degraded wiretap channel. Later,
Csisza´r and Ko¨rner in [2] generalized Wyner’s results
to the general wiretap channel. In these settings, one
transmitter wishes to reliably send one message to a
legitimate receiver, while keeping it secret from an
eavesdropper, where secrecy is defined based on a condi-
tion on some information-theoretic measure that is fully
quantifiable. One of these measures is the information
leakage, defined as the mutual information I(W ;Zn)
between a uniformly distributed random message W
and the channel observations Zn at the eavesdropper, n
being the number of uses of the channel. Based on this
measure, the most common secrecy conditions required
to be satisfied by channel codes are the weak secrecy,
which requires limn→∞ 1nI(W ;Z
n) = 0, and the strong
secrecy, requiring limn→∞ I(W ;Zn) = 0. Although the
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second notion of security is stronger, surprisingly both
conditions result in the same secrecy-capacity [3].
In the last decade, information-theoretic security has
been extended to a large variety of contexts, and polar
codes have become increasingly popular in this area
due to their easily provable secrecy capacity achieving
property. Polar codes were originally proposed by Arikan
in [4] to achieve the capacity of binary-input, symmetric,
point-to-point channels under Successive Cancellation
(SC) decoding. Secrecy capacity achieving polar codes
for the binary symmetric degraded wiretap channel were
introduced in [5] and [6], satisfying the weak and the
strong secrecy condition, respectively. Recently, polar
coding has been extended to the general wiretap channel
in [7]–[10] and to different multiuser scenarios (for in-
stance, see [11] and [12]). Indeed, [9] and [10] generalize
their results providing polar codes for the broadcast
channel with confidential messages.
This paper provides a polar coding scheme that allows
to transmit strongly confidential common information
to two legitimate receivers over the Wiretap Broadcast
Channel (WBC). Although [13] provided an obvious
lower-bound on the secrecy-capacity of this model, no
constructive polar coding scheme has already been pro-
posed so far. Our polar coding scheme is based mainly
on the one introduced by [10] for the broadcast chan-
nel with confidential messages. Therefore, the proposed
polar coding scheme aims to use the optimal amount
of randomness in the encoding. Moreover, in order to
construct an explicit polar coding scheme that provides
strong secrecy, the distribution induced by the encoder
must be close in terms of statistical distance to the
original one considered for the code construction, and
transmitter and legitimate receivers need to share a secret
key of negligible size in terms of rate. Nevertheless, the
particularization for the model proposed in this paper
is not straightforward. Specifically, we propose a new
chaining construction [14] (transmission will take place
over several blocks) that is crucial to secretly transmit
common information to different legitimate receivers.
This construction introduces new dependencies between
the random variables that are involved in the polar coding
scheme that must be considered carefully in the secrecy
analysis. These dependencies are bidirectional between
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2random variables of adjacent blocks and, consequently,
we need to introduce an additional privately-shared key
of negligible length in terms of rate for the polar coding
scheme to provide strong secrecy.
A. Notation
Through this paper, let the interval [a, b], where a, b ∈
Z+ and a ≤ b, denote the set of integers between
a and b (both included). Let un denote a row vector
(u(1), . . . , u(n)). We write u1:j for j ∈ [1, n] to denote
the subvector (u(1), . . . , u(j)). For any set of indices
S ⊆ [1, n], we write u[S] to denote the sequence
{u(j)}j∈S , and we use SC to denote the set complement
in [1, n], that is, SC = [1, n] \ S . If S denotes an event,
then SC also denotes its complement. Consider some
index i ∈ [1, L], where L ∈ Z+, and consider the
vector uni . We write u
n
1:L to denote the set of vectors
{un1 , . . . , unL}. We use ln to denote the natural logarithm,
whereas log denotes the logarithm base 2. Let X be
a random variable taking values in X , and let qx and
px be two different distributions with support X , then
D(qx, px) and V(qx, px) denote the Kullback-Leibler
divergence and the total variation distance respectively.
Finally, h2(p) denotes the binary entropy function, i.e.,
h2(p) = −p log p − (1 − p) log(1 − p), and we define
the indicator function 1{u} such that equals to 1 if the
predicate u is true and 0 otherwise.
B. Organization
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II introduces the channel model formally. In
Section III, the fundamental theorems of polar codes are
revisited. Section IV describes the proposed polar coding
scheme. In Section V, the performance of the coding
scheme is analyzed. Finally, the concluding remarks are
presented in Section VI.
II. CHANNEL MODEL AND ACHIEVABLE REGION
Formally, a WBC (X , pY(1)Y(2)Z|X ,Y(1) × Y(2) × Z)
with 2 legitimate receivers and an external eavesdropper
is characterized by the probability transition function
pY(1)Y(2)Z|X , where X ∈ X denotes the channel in-
put, Y(k) ∈ Y(k) denotes the channel output corre-
sponding to the legitimate receiver k ∈ [1, 2], and
Z ∈ Z denotes the channel output corresponding to the
eavesdropper. We consider a model, namely Common
Information over the WBC (CI-WBC), in which the
transmitter wishes to send a private message W and
a confidential message S to both legitimate receivers.
A code
(d2nRW e, d2nRSe, d2nRRe, n) for the CI-WBC
consist of a private message set W , [1, d2nRW e],
a confidential message set S , [1, d2nRSe], a ran-
domization sequence set R , [1, d2nRRe] (typically
referred as local randomness and needed to confuse
the eavesdropper about the confidential message S), an
encoding function f : W × S × R → Xn that maps
(w, s, r) to a codeword xn, and two decoding functions
g(1) and g(2) such that g(k) : Yn(k) →W×S (k ∈ [1, 2])
maps the k-th legitimate receiver observations yn(k) to
the estimates (wˆ(k), sˆ(k)). The reliability condition to be
satisfied by this code is measured in terms of the average
probability of error and is given by
lim
n→∞P
[
(W,S) 6= (Wˆ(k), Sˆ(k))
]
= 0, k ∈ [1, 2]. (1)
The strong secrecy condition is measured in terms of the
information leakage and is given by
lim
n→∞ I (S;Z
n) = 0. (2)
This model is graphically illustrated in Figure 1. A
triple of rates (RW , RS , RR) ∈ R3+ will be achie-
vable for the CI-WBC if there exists a sequence of
(d2nRW e, d2nRSe, d2nRRe, n) codes such that satisfy the
reliability and secrecy conditions (1) and (2) respectively.
(W,S)
Encoder
Xn
Receiver 1
Receiver 2
Eavesdropper
WBC
pY(1)Y(2)Z|X
(Wˆ(1), Sˆ(1))
(Wˆ(2), Sˆ(2))
AS
Fig. 1: Channel model: CI-WBC.
The achievable rate region is defined as the closure
of the set of all achievable rate triples (RW , RS , RR).
The following proposition defines an inner-bound on the
achievable rate region.
Proposition 1 (Adapted from [13], [15]). The region
RCI-WBC defined by the union over the tiples of rates
(RW , RS , RR) ∈ R3+ satisfying
RW +RS ≤ min
{
I(V ;Y(1)), I(V ;Y(2))
}
,
RS ≤ min
{
I(V ;Y(1)), I(V ;Y(2))
}− I(V ;Z),
RW +RR ≥ I(X;Z),
RR ≥ I(X;Z|V ),
where the union is taken over all distributions pV X such
that V − X − (Y(1), Y(2), Z) forms a Markov chain,
defines an inner-bound on the achievable region of the
CI-WBC.
3III. REVIEW OF POLAR CODES
Let (X × Y, pXY ) be a Discrete Memoryless Source
(DMS), where1 X ∈ {0, 1} and Y ∈ Y . The polar
transform over the n-sequence Xn, n being any power
of 2, is defined as Un , XnGn, where Gn ,
[
1 1
1 0
]⊗n
is the source polarization matrix [18]. Since Gn = G−1n ,
then Xn = UnGn.
The polarization theorem for source coding with
side information [18, Theorem 1] states that the polar
transform extracts the randomness of Xn in the sense
that, as n → ∞, the set of indices j ∈ [1, n] can
be divided practically into two disjoint sets, namely
H(n)X|Y and L(n)X|Y , such that U(j) for j ∈ H(n)X|Y is
practically independent of (U1:j−1, Y n) and uniformly
distributed, that is, H(U(j)|U1:j−1, Y n)→ 1, and U(j)
for j ∈ L(n)X|Y is almost determined by (U1:j−1, Y n),
which means that H(U(j)|U1:j−1, Y n) → 0. Formally,
let δn , 2−n
β
, where β ∈ (0, 12 ), and
H(n)X|Y ,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H(U(j) ∣∣U1:j−1, Y n) ≥ 1− δn} ,
L(n)X|Y ,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H(U(j) ∣∣U1:j−1, Y n) ≤ δn} .
Then, by [18, Theorem 1] we have limn→∞ 1n |H(n)X|Y | =
H(X|Y ) and limn→∞ 1n |L(n)X|Y | = 1 − H(X|Y ). Con-
sequently, the number of elements U(j) that have not
polarized is asymptotically negligible in terms of rate,
that is, limn→∞ 1n |(H(n)X|Y )C \ L(n)X|Y | = 0.
Furthermore, [18, Theorem 2] states that given the part
U [(L(n)X|Y )C] and the channel output observations Y n, the
remaining part U [L(n)X|Y ] can be reconstructed by using
SC decoding with error probability in O(nδn).
Similarly to H(n)X|Y and L(n)X|Y , the sets H(n)X and L(n)X
can be defined by considering that the observations Y n
are absent. Since conditioning does not increase the
entropy, we have H(n)X ⊇ H(n)X|Y and L(n)X ⊆ L(n)X|Y .
A discrete memoryless channel (X , pY |X ,Y) with some
arbitrary pX can be seen as a DMS (X×Y, pXpY |X). In
channel polar coding, first we define the sets of indices
H(n)X|Y , L(n)X|Y , H(n)X and L(n)X from the target distribution
pXpY |X . Then, based on the previous sets, the encoder
somehow constructs2 U˜n and applies the inverse polar
transform X˜n = U˜nGn. Afterwards, the transmitter
sends X˜n over the channel, which induces Y˜ n. Let
(X˜n, Y˜ n) ∼ q˜Xn q˜Y n|Xn , if V(q˜XnY n , pXnY n) → 0
then the receiver can reliably reconstruct U˜ [L(n)X|Y ] from
Y˜ n and U˜ [(L(n)X|Y )C] by performing SC decoding [19].
1Throughout this paper, we assume binary polarization. Neverthe-
less, an extension to q-ary alphabets is possible [16], [17].
2Since the polar-based encoder will construct random variables that
must approach the target distribution of the DMS, throughout this paper
we use tilde above the random variables to emphazise this purpose.
IV. POLAR CODING SCHEME
Let (V × X × Y(1) ×Y(2) ×Z, pV XY(1)Y(2)Z) denote
the DMS that represents the input (V,X) and the output
(Y(1), Y(2), Z) random variables of the CI-WBC, where
|V| = |X | = 2. Without loss of generality, and to avoid
the trivial case RS = 0 in Proposition 1, we assume that
H(V |Z) > H(V |Y(1)) ≥ H(V |Y(2)). (3)
If H(V |Y(1)) < H(V |Y(2)), one can simply exchange
the role of Y(1) and Y(2) in the encoding scheme of
Section IV. We propose a polar coding scheme that
achieves the following rate triple,
(RW , RS , RR)
= (I(V ;Z), I(V ;Y(1))− I(V ;Z), I(X;Z|V )), (4)
which corresponds to the one of the region in Proposi-
tion 1 such that the confidential message rate is maxi-
mum and the amount of local randomness is minimum.
For the input random variable V of the DMS, we
define the polar transform An , V nGn and the sets
H(n)V ,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H(A(j)∣∣A1:j−1) ≥ 1− δn}, (5)
H(n)V |Z ,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H(A(j)∣∣A1:j−1, Zn)
≥ 1− δn
}
, (6)
L(n)V |Z ,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H(A(j)∣∣A1:j−1, Zn) ≤ δn}, (7)
L(n)V |Y(k) ,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H(A(j)∣∣A1:j−1, Y n(k)) ≤ δn}, (8)
where k ∈ [1, 2]. For the input random variable X , we
define Tn , XnGn and the associated sets
H(n)X|V ,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H(T (j)∣∣T 1:j−1, V n)
≥ 1− δn
}
. (9)
H(n)X|V Z ,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H(T (j)∣∣T 1:j−1, V n, Zn)
≥ 1− δn
}
. (10)
We have pAnTn(an, tn) = pV nXn(anGn, tnGn) due to
the invertibility of Gn and, for convenience, we write
pAnTn(a
n, tn)
= pAn(a
n)pTn|V n(tn|anGn)
=
( n∏
j=1
pA(j)|A1:j−1(a(j)|a1:j−1)
)
·
( n∏
j=1
pT (j)|T 1:j−1V n(t(j)|t1:j−1, anGn)
)
. (11)
The non-degraded nature of the broadcast channel
means having to use a chaining construction [14]. Hence,
consider that the encoding takes place over L blocks
indexed by i ∈ [1, L]. At the i-th block, the encoder
will construct A˜ni , which will carry the private and
4the confidential messages intended to both legitimate
receivers. Additionally, the encoder will store into A˜ni
some elements from A˜ni−1 (if i ∈ [2, L]) and A˜ni+1 (if
i ∈ [1, L−1]) so that both legitimate receivers are able to
reliably reconstruct A˜n1:L. Then, given V˜
n
i = A˜
n
i Gn, the
encoder will perform the polar-based channel prefixing
to construct T˜ni . Finally, it will obtain X˜
n
i = T˜
n
i Gn,
which will be transmitted over the WBC inducing the
channel outputs (Y˜ n(1),i, Y˜
n
(2),i, Z˜
n
i ).
A. General polar-based encoding
Consider the construction of A˜n1:L. Besides the sets
defined in (5)–(8), we define the partition of H(n)V :
G(n) , H(n)V |Z , (12)
C(n) , H(n)V ∩
(H(n)V |Z)C. (13)
Moreover, we also define
G(n)0 , G(n) ∩ L(n)V |Y(1) ∩ L
(n)
V |Y(2) , (14)
G(n)1 , G(n) ∩
(L(n)V |Y(1))C ∩ L(n)V |Y(2) , (15)
G(n)2 , G(n) ∩ L(n)V |Y(1) ∩
(L(n)V |Y(2))C, (16)
G(n)1,2 , G(n) ∩
(L(n)V |Y(1))C ∩ (L(n)V |Y(2))C, (17)
which form a partition of the set G(n), and
C(n)0 , C(n) ∩ L(n)V |Y(1) ∩ L
(n)
V |Y(2) , (18)
C(n)1 , C(n) ∩
(L(n)V |Y(1))C ∩ L(n)V |Y(2) , (19)
C(n)2 , C(n) ∩ L(n)V |Y(1) ∩
(L(n)V |Y(2))C, (20)
C(n)1,2 , C(n) ∩
(L(n)V |Y(1))C ∩ (L(n)V |Y(2))C, (21)
which form a partition of C(n). These sets are graphically
represented in Figure 2. Roughly speaking, according to
(5), A[H(n)V ] is the nearly uniformly distributed part of
An. Thus, A˜i[H(n)V ], i ∈ [1, L], is suitable for storing uni-
formly distributed random sequences. According to (6),
A[H(n)V |Z ] is almost independent of Zn. Thus, A˜i[G(n)] is
suitable for storing information to be secured from the
eavesdropper, whereas A˜i[C(n)] is not. Sets in (14)–(21)
with subscript 1 (sets inside the red curve in Figure 2)
form H(n)V ∩ (L(n)V |Y(1))C, while those with subscript 2
(sets inside the blue curve) form H(n)V ∩ (L(n)V |Y(2))C.
From Section III, A˜i[H(n)V ∩ (L(n)V |Y(k))C] is the nearly
uniformly distributed part of the sequence A˜ni required
by legitimate receiver k to reliably reconstruct the entire
sequence by performing SC decoding.
For sufficiently large n, assumption (3) imposes the
following restriction on the size of the previous sets:∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣ ≥ ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣ > ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣.
(22)
C(n)0
C(n)2 C(n)1C(n)1,2
G(n)0
G(n)2 G(n)1
G(n)1,2
Fig. 2: Graphical representation of the sets in (12)–(21). The
indices inside the soft and dark gray area form G(n) and
C(n) respectively. The indices that form H(n)V ∩ (L(n)V |Y(1))
C are
those inside the red curve, while those inside the blue curve
form H(n)V ∩ (L(n)V |Y(2))
C.
The left-hand inequality in (22) holds from the fact that∣∣C(n)1 ∪ G(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)2 ∪ G(n)2 ∣∣
=
∣∣H(n)V ∩ (L(n)V |Y(1))C \ H(n)V ∩ (L(n)V |Y(2))C∣∣
−∣∣H(n)V ∩ (L(n)V |Y(2))C \ H(n)V ∩ (L(n)V |Y(1))C∣∣
=
∣∣H(n)V ∩ (L(n)V |Y(1))C∣∣− ∣∣H(n)V ∩ (L(n)V |Y(2))C∣∣
≥ 0,
where the positivity holds by [18, Theorem 1] because
lim
n→∞
1
n
∣∣H(n)V ∩ (L(n)V |Y(k))C∣∣
= lim
n→∞
1
n
∣∣H(n)V |Y(k) ∣∣
+ lim
n→∞
1
n
∣∣H(n)V ∩ (L(n)V |Y(k))C \ H(n)V |Y(k)∣∣
= H(V |Y(k)),
for any k ∈ [1, 2]. Similarly, the right-hand inequality in
(22) follows from [18, Theorem 1] and the fact that∣∣G(n)0 ∪ G(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1 ∪ C(n)1,2 ∣∣
=
∣∣H(n)V |Z \ H(n)V ∩ (L(n)V |Y(1))C∣∣
−∣∣H(n)V ∩ (L(n)V |Y(1))C \ H(n)V |Z∣∣
=
∣∣H(n)V |Z∣∣− ∣∣H(n)V ∩ (L(n)V |Y(1))C∣∣.
Thus, according to (22), we must consider four cases:
A. |G(n)1 | > |C(n)2 |, |G(n)2 | > |C(n)1 | and |G(n)0 | ≥ |C(n)1,2 |;
B. |G(n)1 | > |C(n)2 |, |G(n)2 | > |C(n)1 | and |G(n)0 | < |C(n)1,2 |;
C. |G(n)1 | ≥ |C(n)2 |, |G(n)2 | ≤ |C(n)1 | and |G(n)0 | > |C(n)1,2 |;
D. |G(n)1 | < |C(n)2 |, |G(n)2 | < |C(n)1 | and |G(n)0 | > |C(n)1,2 |.
The generic encoding process for all cases is sum-
marized in Algorithm 1. For i ∈ [1, L], let Wi be a
uniformly distributed vector of length |C(n)| that repre-
sents the private message. The encoder forms A˜i[C(n)]
by simply storing Wi. Indeed, if i ∈ [1, L − 1], notice
that the encoder forms A˜i+1[C(n)] before constructing
the entire sequence A˜ni .
5From A˜i[C(n)], i ∈ [1, L], we define the sequences
Ψ
(V )
i , A˜i[C(n)2 ], (23)
Γ
(V )
i , A˜i[C(n)1,2 ], (24)
Θ
(V )
i , A˜i[C(n)1 ]. (25)
Notice that [Ψ(V )i ,Γ
(V )
i ] = A˜i[C(n)2 ∪C(n)1,2 ] is required by
legitimate receiver 2 to reliably estimate A˜ni entirely and,
thus, the encoder repeats [Ψ(V )i ,Γ
(V )
i ], if i ∈ [1, L− 1],
conveniently in A˜i+1[G(n)] (the function form_AG is
responsible of the chaining construction and is described
later). On the other hand, [Θ(V )i ,Γ
(V )
i ] = A˜i[C(n)1 ∪C(n)1,2 ]
is required by legitimate receiver 1. Nevertheless, in
order to satisfy the strong secrecy condition in (2),
[Θ
(V )
i ,Γ
(V )
i ], i ∈ [2, L], is not repeated directly into
A˜i−1[G(n)], but the encoder copies instead Θ¯(V )i and
Γ¯
(V )
i obtained as follows. Let κ
(V )
Θ and κ
(V )
Γ be uni-
formly distributed keys with length |C(n)1 | and |C(n)1,2 |
respectively, which are privately shared between trans-
mitter and both legitimate receivers. For any i ∈ [2, L],
we define the sequences
Θ¯
(V )
i , A˜i[C(n)1 ]⊕ κ(V )Θ , (26)
Γ¯
(V )
i , A˜i[C(n)1,2 ]⊕ κ(V )Γ . (27)
Since these secret keys are reused in all blocks, their size
becomes negligible in terms of rate for L large enough.
The function form_AG in Algorithm 1 constructs se-
quences A˜1:L[G(n)] differently depending on which case,
among cases A, B, C or D described before, characterizes
the given CI-WBC. This part of the encoding is described
in detail in Section IV-B and Algorithm 2.
Then, given A˜i[C(n) ∪ G(n)], the encoder forms the
remaining entries of A˜ni , i.e., A˜i[(H(n)V )C], as follows. If
j ∈ L(n)V , it constructs A˜i(j) deterministically by using
SC encoding as in [20]. Thus, we define the SC encoding
function ξ(V )(j) : {0, 1}j−1 → {0, 1} in Algorithm 1 as
ξ
(V )
(j)
(
a1:j−1
)
, arg max
a∈V
pA(j)|A1:j−1
(
a
∣∣a1:j−1 ) , (28)
pA(j)|A1:j−1 corresponding to the distribution of the
original DMS –see (11)–. Therefore, notice that only the
part A˜i[(H(n)V )C \ L(n)V ] of A˜ni is constructed randomly.
Finally, for i ∈ [1, L], given V˜ ni = A˜ni Gn, a ran-
domization sequence Ri and a uniformly distributed
random sequence Λ(V )0 , the encoder performs the polar-
based channel prefixing (function pb_ch_pref in Al-
gorithm 1) to obtain X˜ni , which is transmitted over the
WBC inducing outputs Y˜ n(1),i, Y˜
n
(2),i and Z˜
n
i . This part
of the encoding is described in detail in Section IV-C.
Furthermore, the encoder obtains
Φ
(V )
(k),i , A˜i
[
(H(n)V )C ∩ (L(n)V |Y(k))
C] (29)
Algorithm 1 Generic PC encoding scheme
Require: Private and confidential messages W1:L and S1:L;
randomization sequences R1:L; random sequence Λ
(X)
0 ;
and secret keys κ(V )Θ , κ
(V )
Γ , κ
(V )
ΥΦ(1)
and κ(V )ΥΦ(2) .
1 Ψ(V )0 , Γ
(V )
0 , Π
(V )
0 , Λ
(V )
0 , Θ¯
(V )
L+1, Γ¯
(V )
L+1 ← ∅
2 A˜1[C(n)]←W1
3 Ψ(V )1 ,Γ
(V )
1 ← A˜1[C(n)]
4 Θ¯(V )1 , Γ¯
(V )
1 ← ∅ . For notation purposes
5 for i = 1 to L do
6 if i 6= L then
7 A˜i+1[C(n)]←Wi+1
8 Ψ(V )i+1,Γ
(V )
i+1, Θ¯
(V )
i+1, Γ¯
(V )
i+1 ←
(
A˜i+1[C(n)], κ(V )Θ , κ(V )Γ
)
9 end if
10 A˜ni , Π
(V )
i , Λ
(V )
i ← form_AG
(
i, Si, Θ¯
(V )
i+1, Γ¯
(V )
i+1, . . .
Ψ
(V )
i−1,Γ
(V )
i−1,Π
(V )
i−1,Λ
(V )
i−1
)
11 if i = 1 then Υ(V )(1) ← A˜1
[H(n)V ∩ (L(n)V |Y(1))C]
12 if i = L then Υ(V )(2) ← A˜L
[H(n)V ∩ (L(n)V |Y(2))C]
13 for j ∈ (H(n)V )C do
14 if j ∈ (H(n)V )C \ L(n)V then
15 A˜(j)← pA(j)|A1:j−1
(
a˜i(j)
∣∣a˜1:j−1i )
16 else if j ∈ L(n)V then
17 A˜(j)← arg maxa∈V pA(j)|A1:j−1
(
a|a1:j−1)
18 end if
19 end for
20 Φ(V )(k),i ← A˜i
[(H(n)V )C ∩ (L(n)V |Y(k))C], k ∈ [1, 2]
21 X˜ni ,Λ
(X)
i ← pb_ch_pref
(
A˜ni Gn, Ri,Λ
(X)
i−1
)
22 end for
23 Send
(
Φ
(V )
(k),i,Υ
(V )
(k)
)⊕ κ(V )ΥΦ(k) to the receiver k ∈ [1, 2]
24 return X˜n1:L
for any k ∈ [1, 2] and i ∈ [1, L], which is required by
legitimate receiver k to reliably estimate A˜ni entirely.
Since Φ(V )(k),i is not nearly uniform, the encoder cannot
make it available to the legitimate receiver k by means
of the chaining structure. Also, the encoder obtains
Υ
(V )
(1) , A˜1
[H(n)V ∩ (L(n)V |Y(1))C], (30)
Υ
(V )
(2) , A˜L
[H(n)V ∩ (L(n)V |Y(2))C]. (31)
The sequence Υ(V )(1) is required by legitimate receiver 1
to initialize the decoding process, while the sequence
Υ
(V )
(2) is required by legitimate receiver 2. Therefore, the
transmitter additionally sends (Υ(V )(k) ,Φ
(V )
(k),i)⊕ κ(V )ΥΦ(k) to
legitimate receiver k, κ(V )ΥΦ(k) being a uniformly dis-
tributed key with size
L
∣∣∣(H(n)V )C ∩ (L(n)V |Y(k))C∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣H(n)V ∩ (L(n)V |Y(k))C∣∣∣
that is privately shared between transmitter and the
corresponding receiver. We show in Section V-A that the
length of κ(V )ΥΦ(1) and κ
(V )
ΥΦ(2)
is asymptotically negligible
in terms of rate.
6B. Function form_AG.
Function form_AG encodes the confidential messages
S1:L and builds the chaining construction.
Based on the sets in (12)–(21), let R(n)1 ⊆ G(n)0 ∪G(n)2 ,
R′(n)1 ⊆ G(n)2 ,R(n)2 ⊆ G(n)1 ,R′(n)2 ⊆ G(n)1 ,R(n)1,2 ⊆ G(n)0 ,
R′(n)1,2 ⊆ G(n)0 , I(n) ⊆ G(n)0 ∪ G(n)2 , R(n)S ⊆ G(n)1 and
R(n)Λ ⊆ G(n)1 form an additional partition of G(n). The
definition of R(n)1 , R′(n)1 , R(n)2 , R′(n)2 , R(n)1,2 and R′(n)1,2
will depend on the particular case (among A to D), while
I(n) , (G(n)0 ∪ G(n)2 )
\(R(n)1 ∪R′(n)1 ∪R(n)1,2 ∪R′(n)1,2 ), (32)
R(n)S , any subset of G(n)1 \
(R(n)2 ∪R′(n)2 )
with size
∣∣I(n) ∩ G(n)2 ∣∣, (33)
R(n)Λ , G(n)1,2 ∪
(G(n)1 \ (R(n)2 ∪R′(n)2 ∪R(n)S )). (34)
For i ∈ [1, L], let Si denote a uniformly distributed
vector that represents the confidential message. The
message S1 has size |I(n)∪G(n)1 ∪G(n)1,2 |; for i ∈ [2, L−1],
Si has size |I(n)|; and SL has size |I(n) ∪ G(n)2 |.
For i ∈ [1, L], we write Ψ(V )i ,
[
Ψ
(V )
1,i ,Ψ
(V )
2,i
]
,
Γ
(V )
i ,
[
Γ
(V )
1,i ,Γ
(V )
2,i
]
, Θ¯(V )i ,
[
Θ¯
(V )
1,i , Θ¯
(V )
2,i
]
and Γ¯(V )i ,[
Γ¯
(V )
1,i , Γ¯
(V )
2,i
]
; and we define Ψp,i, Γp,i, Θ¯p,i and Γ¯p,i, for
any p ∈ [1, 2], accordingly in each case.
1) Case A: In this case, recall that |G(n)1 | > |C(n)2 |,
|G(n)2 | > |C(n)1 | and |G(n)0 | ≥ |C(n)1,2 |. We define
R(n)1 , any subset of G(n)2 with size
∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣, (35)
R(n)2 , any subset of G(n)1 with size
∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣, (36)
R(n)1,2 , any subset of G(n)0 with size
∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣, (37)
and R′(n)1 = R′(n)2 = R′(n)1,2 , ∅. By the assumption of
Case A, it is clear that R(n)1 , R(n)2 and R(n)1,2 exist. Also,
by (22), the set I(n) exists, and so will R(n)S because∣∣G(n)1 \ (R(n)2 ∪R′(n)2 )∣∣− ∣∣I(n) ∩ G(n)2 ∣∣
=
∣∣G(n)1 \ (R(n)2 ∪R′(n)2 )∣∣− ∣∣(G(n)2 \ R(n)1 ∪R′(n)1 )∣∣
=
∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣
≥ 0.
For i ∈ [1, L], we define Ψ(V )1,i , Ψ(V )i , Γ(V )1,i , Γ(V )i ,
Θ¯
(V )
1,i , Θ¯
(V )
i , Γ¯
(V )
1,i , Γ¯
(V )
i and, therefore, we have
Ψ
(V )
2,i = Γ
(V )
2,i = Θ¯
(V )
2,i = Γ¯
(V )
2,i , ∅.
From (20), we have C(n)2 ⊆ L(n)V |Y(1) \ L
(n)
V |Y(2) . Thus,
Ψ
(V )
i−1 = A˜i−1[C(n)2 ] is needed by receiver 2 to reliably
reconstruct A˜ni−1, but can be reliably inferred by re-
ceiver 1 given A˜i−1[(L(n)V |Y(1))C]. Thus, according to
Algorithm 2, the encoder repeats the entire sequence
Ψ
(V )
i−1 in A˜i[R(n)2 ] ⊆ A˜i[L(n)V |Y(2) \ L
(n)
V |Y(1) ].
Algorithm 2 Function form_AG
Require: i, Si, Θ¯(V )i+1, Γ¯
(V )
i+1, Ψ
(V )
i−1, Γ
(V )
i−1, Π
(V )
i−1, Λ
(V )
i−1
1 Define a partition of G(n) according to each case: R(n)1 ,
R′(n)1 , R(n)2 , R′(n)2 , R(n)1,2 , R′(n)1,2 , I(n), R(n)S and R(n)Λ
2 if i = 1 then A˜1[I(n) ∪ G(n)1 ∪ G(n)1,2 ]← S1
3 if i ∈ [2, L− 1] then A˜i[I(n)]← Si
4 if i = L then A˜L[I(n) ∪ G(n)2 ]← SL
5 Ψ(V )1,i−1, Ψ
(V )
2,i−1 ← Ψ(V )i−1
6 Γ(V )1,i−1, Γ
(V )
2,i−1 ← Γ(V )i−1
7 Θ¯(V )1,i+1, Θ¯
(V )
2,i+1 ← Θ¯(V )i+1
8 Γ¯(V )1,i+1, Γ¯
(V )
2,i+1 ← Γ¯(V )i+1
9 A˜i[R(n)1,2 ]← Γ(V )1,i−1 ⊕ Γ¯(V )1,i+1
10 A˜i[R′(n)1,2 ]← Ψ(V )2,i−1 ⊕ Θ¯(V )2,i+1
11 if i ∈ [1, L− 1] then
12 A˜1[R(n)1 ]← Θ¯(V )1,i+1
13 A˜1[R′(n)1 ]← Γ¯(V )2,i+1
14 end if
15 if i ∈ [2, L] then
16 A˜i[R(n)2 ]← Ψ(V )1,i−1
17 A˜i[R′(n)2 ]← Γ(V )2,i−1
18 A˜i[R(n)S ]← Π(V )i−1
19 A˜i[R(n)Λ ]← Λ(V )i−1
20 end if
21 Π(V )i ← A˜i[I(n) ∩ G(n)2 ]
22 Λ(V )i ← A˜i[R(n)Λ ]
23 return the sequences A˜ni , Π
(V )
i and Λ
(V )
i
Similarly, from (19), we have C(n)1 ⊆ L(n)V |Y(1)\L
(n)
V |Y(2) .
Thus, Θ(V )i+1 = A˜i+1[C(n)1 ] is needed by receiver 1 to
reliably reconstruct A˜ni+1 but given A˜i[(L(n)V |Y(2))C] can
be inferred by receiver 2. Thus, the encoder repeats the
sequence Θ¯(V )i+1 in A˜i[R(n)1 ] ⊆ A˜i[L(n)V |Y(2) \ L
(n)
V |Y(1) ].
Finally, from (21), C(n)1,2 ⊆ (L(n)V |Y(2))C ∩ (L
(n)
V |Y(1))
C.
Thus, Γ(V )i−1 and Γ
(V )
i+1 are needed by both receivers
to reliably reconstruct the sequences A˜ni−1 and A˜
n
i+1
respectively. Consequently, the encoder repeats Γ(V )i−1 and
Γ¯
(V )
i+1 in A˜i[R(n)1,2 ] ⊆ A˜i[L(n)V |Y(1) ∩ L
(n)
V |Y(2) ]. Indeed, both
sequences are repeated in the same entries of A˜i[G(n)0 ]
by performing Γ(V )i−1 ⊕ Γ¯(V )i+1. Since Γ(V )0 = Γ¯(V )L+1 = ∅,
only Γ¯(V )2 is repeated at block 1 and Γ
(V )
L−1 at block L.
Moreover, part of secret message Si, i ∈ [1, L], is
stored into some entries of A˜ni whose indices belong to
G(n)2 . Thus, in any block i ∈ [2, L], the encoder repeats
Π
(V )
i−1 , A˜i−1[I(n) ∩ G(n)2 ] (38)
in A˜i[R(n)S ] ⊆ A˜i[L(n)V |Y(2) \ L
(n)
V |Y(1) ]. Also, it repeats
Λ
(V )
i−1 , A˜i−1[R(n)Λ ] (39)
in A˜i[R(n)Λ ]. Hence, Λ(V )1 is repeated in all blocks.
7These sets that form the partition of G(n) in Case A
can be seen in Figure 3, which also displays the encoding
process that aims to construct A˜1:L[C(n) ∪ G(n)].
Block 1 Block 2
Block 3 Block 4
Fig. 3: For Case A, graphical representation of the encoding
that leads to the construction of A˜1:L[H(n)V ] when L = 4. Con-
sider the block 2, R(n)1 , R(n)2 , R(n)1,2 , R(n)S and R(n)Λ are those
areas filled with yellow squares, blue circles, blue and yellow
diamonds, pink crosses, and gray pentagons, respectively; the
set I(n) is the green filled area. At block i ∈ [1, L], Wi is
represented by symbols of the same color (e.g., red symbols
at block 2), and Θ(V )i , Ψ
(V )
i and Γ
(V )
i are represented by
squares, circles and triangles respectively. Also, Θ¯(V )i and Γ¯
(V )
i
are denoted by squares and triangles, respectively, with a line
through them. At block i ∈ [2, L − 1], the diamonds denote
Γ
(V )
i−1⊕ Γ¯(V )i+1. In block i ∈ [1, L], Si is stored into those entries
whose indices belong to the green area. For i ∈ [1, L − 1],
Π
(V )
i is denoted by crosses (e.g., purple crosses at block 2),
and is repeated into A˜i+1
[R(n)S ]. The sequence Λ(V )1 from S1
is represented by gray pentagons and is repeated in all blocks.
The sequences Υ(V )(1) and Υ
(V )
(2) are those entries inside the red
and blue curve at block 1 and L, respectively.
2) Case B: In this case, recall that |G(n)1 | > |C(n)2 |,
|G(n)2 | > |C(n)1 | and |G(n)0 | < |C(n)1,2 |. We define R(n)1 and
R(n)2 as in (35) and (36) respectively, and R′(n)1,2 , ∅.
Now, since |G(n)0 | < |C(n)1,2 |, for any i ∈ [1, L] only a part
of Γ(V )i−1 ⊕ Γ¯(V )i+1 can be repeated entirely in A˜i[G(n)0 ].
Thus, we define R(n)1,2 , G(n)0 and
R′(n)1 , any subset of G(n)2 \ R(n)1
with size
∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣, (40)
R′(n)2 , any subset of G(n)1 \ R(n)2
with size
∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣. (41)
Obviously,R(n)1,2 exists and, by the assumption of Case B,
so do R(n)1 and R(n)2 . By (22), R′(n)1 exists and so does
I(n). Indeed, since G(n)0 \ R(n)1,2 = ∅, then I(n) ⊆ G(n)2 .
Again by (22), R′(n)2 exists and so does R(n)S because∣∣G(n)1 \ (R(n)2 ∪R′(n)2 )∣∣− ∣∣(G(n)2 \ R(n)1 ∪R′(n)1 )∣∣
=
∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣− (∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣)
−
(∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣− (∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣))
=
∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣+ ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣
≥ 0.
Indeed, since I(n) ⊆ G(n)2 , notice that |R(n)S | = |I(n)|.
These sets that form the partition of G(n) in Case B can
be seen in Figure 4, which also displays the encoding
process that aims to construct A˜1:L[C(n) ∪ G(n)].
Block 1 Block 2
Block 3 Block 4
Fig. 4: For Case B, graphically representation of the encoding
that leads to the construction of A˜1:L[H(n)V ] when L = 4.
Consider the block 2, the sets R(n)1 , R′(n)1 , R(n)2 , R′(n)2 , R(n)1,2 ,
R(n)S and R(n)Λ are those areas filled with yellow squares,
yellow triangles, blue circles, blue triangles, blue and yellow
diamonds, pink crosses, and gray pentagons, respectively; and
I(n) is the green filled area with purple crosses. At block
i ∈ [1, L], Wi is represented by symbols of the same color
(e.g., red symbols at block 2), and Θ(V )i , Ψ
(V )
i and Γ
(V )
i
are represented by squares, circles and triangles respectively.
Also, Θ¯(V )i and Γ¯
(V )
i are denoted by squares and triangles,
respectively, with a line through them. At block i ∈ [2, 3],
the diamonds denote Γ(V )i−1,1 ⊕ Γ¯(V )1,i+1. In block i ∈ [1, L],
Si is stored into those entries whose indices belong to the
green area. For i ∈ [2, L− 1], Π(V )i = Si and, therefore, Si is
repeated entirely into A˜i+1[R(n)S ]. The sequence Λ(V )1 from S1
is represented by gray pentagons and is repeated in all blocks.
The sequences Υ(V )(1) and Υ
(V )
(2) are the entries inside the red
and blue curve at block 1 and L, respectively.
In this case, for any i ∈ [1, L], Ψ(V )1,i , Ψ(V )i ,
Θ¯
(V )
1,i , Θ¯
(V )
i and Ψ
(V )
2,i = Θ¯
(V )
2,i , ∅; and we define
Γ
(V )
1,i and Γ¯
(V )
1,i as any part of Γ
(V )
i and Γ¯
(V )
i , respectively,
8with size |R(n)1,2 |, and Γ(V )2,i and Γ¯(V )2,i as the remaining
parts with size |C(n)1,2 | − |R(n)1,2 |. Now, the encoder copies
Γ
(V )
1,i−1⊕Γ¯(V )1,i+1 into A˜i[R(n)1,2 ], and Γ(V )2,i−1 and Γ¯(V )2,i+1 into
A˜i[R′(n)2 ] and A˜i[R′(n)1 ] respectively. Moreover, since
I(n) ⊆ G(n)2 , notice that Π(V )i = Si for any i ∈ [2, L−1].
3) Case C: In this case, recall that |G(n)1 | ≥ |C(n)2 |,
|G(n)2 | ≤ |C(n)1 | and |G(n)0 | > |C(n)1,2 |. Hence, we define
R(n)2 and R(n)1,2 as in (36) and (37) respectively, and
R′(n)1 = R′(n)2 = R′(n)1,2 , ∅. On the other hand, since
|G(n)2 | ≤ |C(n)1 |, now for i ∈ [1, L−1] only a part of Θ¯(V )i+1
can be repeated entirely in A˜i[G(n)2 ], and we define
R(n)1 , the union of G(n)2 with any subset of
G(n)0 \ R(n)1,2 with size
∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣. (42)
It is clear that R(n)2 and R(n)1,2 exist. By (22), R(n)1 also
exists and, hence, so does I(n). Since R(n)1 ⊇ G(n)2 ,
I(n)∩G(n)2 = ∅ and R(n)S = ∅. These sets that form G(n)
are represented in Figure 5, which also displays the part
of the encoding that aims to construct A˜1:L[C(n)∪G(n)].
Block 1 Block 2
Block 3 Block 4
Fig. 5: For Case C, graphically representation of the encoding
that leads to the construction of A˜1:L[H(n)V ] when L = 4.
Consider the block 2, R(n)1 , R(n)2 , R(n)1,2 and R(n)Λ are those
areas filled with yellow squares, blue circles, blue and yellow
diamonds, and gray pentagons, respectively; and I(n) is the
green filled area. At block i ∈ [1, L], Wi is represented by
symbols of the same color (e.g., red symbols at block 2), and
Θ
(V )
i , Ψ
(V )
i and Γ
(V )
i are represented by squares, circles and
triangles respectively. Also, Θ¯(V )i and Γ¯
(V )
i are denoted by
squares and triangles, respectively, with a line through them.
At block i ∈ [2, 3], the diamonds denote Γ(V )i−1,1 ⊕ Γ¯(V )1,i+1. For
i ∈ [1, L], Si is stored into those entries belonging to the green
area. Λ(V )1 is represented by gray pentagons and is repeated in
all blocks. The sequences Υ(V )(1) and Υ
(V )
(2) are the entries inside
the red and blue circumference at block 1 and L, respectively.
In this case, for i ∈ [1, L], we define Ψ(V )1,i , Ψ(V )i ,
Γ
(V )
1,i , Γ
(V )
i , Θ¯
(V )
1,i , Θ¯
(V )
i , Γ¯
(V )
1,i , Γ¯
(V )
i , and
Ψ
(V )
2,i = Γ
(V )
2,i = Θ¯
(V )
2,i = Γ¯
(V )
2,i , ∅. Moreover, notice
that Π(V )i = ∅ because I(n) ∩ G(n)2 = ∅.
4) Case D: In this case, recall that |G(n)1 | < |C(n)2 |,
|G(n)2 | ≤ |C(n)1 | and |G(n)0 | > |C(n)1,2 |. As in Case A and
Case C, since |G(n)0 | > |C(n)1,2 | we define R(n)1,2 as in (37)
and R′(n)1 = R′(n)2 , ∅. Thus, for i ∈ [1, L], we set
Γ
(V )
1,i , Γ
(V )
i , Γ¯
(V )
1,i , Γ¯
(V )
i and Γ¯
(V )
2,i = Γ
(V )
2,i , ∅. On
the other hand, since |G(n)1 | < |C(n)2 |, now for i ∈ [2, L]
only a part of Ψ¯(V )i−1 can be repeated entirely in A˜i[G(n)1 ],
and we define R(n)2 , G(n)1 and
R′(n)1,2 , any subset of G(n)0 \ R(n)1,2
with size
∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣. (43)
By (22), it is clear that R′(n)1,2 exists. Also, for i ∈ [1, L],
we define Ψ(V )1,i as any part Ψ
(V )
i with size |G(n)1 |, and
Ψ
(V )
2,i as the remaining part with size |C(n)2
∣∣− ∣∣G(n)1 |.
Despite
∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣ < ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣ as in Case C, the set R(n)1 is
not defined as in (42), but
R(n)1 , the union of G(n)2 with any subset
of G(n)0 \
(R(n)1,2 ∪R′(n)1,2 ) with size∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣− (∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣). (44)
By the assumption in (22), the set R(n)1 exists because∣∣G(n)0 \ (R(n)1,2 ∪R′(n)1,2 )∣∣− ∣∣R(n)1 ∣∣
=
∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣+ ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣
−
(∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣+ ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣)
=
∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣+ ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣
≥ 0.
Also, for i ∈ [1, L], we define Θ¯(V )1,i as any part Θ¯(V )i
with size |C(n)1 | − (|C(n)2 | − |G(n)1 |), and Θ¯(V )2,i as the
remaining part with size |C(n)2
∣∣− ∣∣G(n)1 |.
Thus, according to Algorithm 2, instead of repeating
Ψ
(V )
2,i−1, that is, the part of Ψ
(V )
i−1 that does not fit in
A˜ni [G(n)1 ], in a specific part of A˜ni [G(n)0 ], the encoder
stores Ψ(V )2,i−1⊕Θ¯(V )2,i+1 into A˜i[R′(n)1,2 ] ⊆ A˜i[G(n)0 ], where
Θ¯
(V )
2,i+1 denotes part of those elements of Θ¯
(V )
i+1 that do
not fit in A˜ni [G(n)2 ]. Furthermore, as in Case C, since
I(n) ∩ G(n)2 = ∅, we have Π(V )i = ∅.
The sets that form the partition of G(n) in Case D can
be seen in Figure 6, which also displays the encoding
process that aims to construct of A˜1:L[C(n) ∪ G(n)].
9Block 1 Block 2
Block 3 Block 4
Fig. 6: For Case D, graphically representation of the encoding
that leads to the construction of A˜1:L
[H(n)V ] when L = 4.
Consider the block 2, R(n)1 , R(n)2 , R(n)1,2 , R′(n)1,2 and R(n)Λ are
those areas filled with yellow squares, blue circles, blue and
yellow diamonds, yellow squares overlapped by blue circles,
and gray pentagons, respectively; the set I(n) is the green
filled area. At block i ∈ [1, L], Wi is represented by symbols
of the same color (e.g., red symbols at block 2), and Θ(V )i ,
Ψ
(V )
i and Γ
(V )
i are represented by squares, circles and triangles
respectively. Also, Θ¯(V )i and Γ¯
(V )
i are denoted by squares
and triangles, respectively, with a line through them. At block
i ∈ [2, 3], Γ(V )i−1,1⊕Γ¯(V )1,i+1 are represented by diamonds, and the
squares overlapped by circles denote Ψ(V )2,i−1⊕Θ¯(V )2,i+1. At block
i ∈ [1, L], Si is stored into those entries that belong to the
green area. Λ(V )1 is denoted by gray pentagons and is repeated
in all blocks. The sequences Υ(V )(1) and Υ
(V )
(2) are the entries
inside the red and blue curve at block 1 and L, respectively.
C. Channel prefixing
For i ∈ [1, L], let Ri be a uniformly distributed
vector of length |H(n)X|V \ H(n)X|V Z | that represents the
randomization sequence (local randomness). Moreover,
let Λ(X)0 be a uniformly distributed random sequence of
size |H(n)X|V Z |. The channel prefixing aims to construct
X˜ni = T˜
n
i Gn and is summarized in Algorithm 3.
Notice that the sequence Λ(X)0 is copied in T˜i[H(n)X|V Z ]
at any block i ∈ [1, L], while Ri is stored into
T˜i[H(n)X|V ∩ (H(n)X|V Z)C]. After obtaining T˜i[H(n)X|V ], and
given the sequence V˜ ni , A˜ni Gn, the encoder forms the
remaining entries of T˜ni , that is, T˜i[(H(n)X|V )C] as follows.
If j ∈ (H(n)X|V )C \ L(n)X|V , the encoder randomly draws
T˜i(j) from pT (j)|T 1:j−1|V n corresponding to the joint
distribution of the original DMS –see (11)–. Otherwise,
if j ∈ L(n)X|V , it constructs T˜i(j) deterministically by
using SC encoding as in [20]. Thus, we define the SC
Algorithm 3 Function pb_ch_pref
Require: V˜ ni , Ri, Λ
(X)
i−1
1 T˜i[H(n)X|V Z ]← Λ(X)i−1
2 T˜i[H(n)X|V ∩ (H(n)X|V Z)C]← Ri
3 for j ∈ (H(n)X|V )C do
4 if j ∈ (H(n)X|V )C \ L(n)X|V then
5 T˜ (j)←pT (j)|T1:j−1V n
(
t˜i(j)
∣∣t˜1:j−1i , v˜ni )
6 else if j ∈ L(n)X|V then
7 T˜ (j)← ξ(X)(j)
(
t˜1:j−1i , v˜
n
i
)
8 end if
9 end for
10 X˜ni ← T˜ni Gn
11 Λ(X)i ← T˜i[H(n)X|V \ H(n)X|V Z ]
12 return X˜ni and Λ
(X)
i
encoding function ξ(X)(j) : {0, 1}(j−1)·n → {0, 1} as
ξ
(X)
(j)
(
t1:j−1, vn
)
, arg max
t∈X
pT (j)|T 1:j−1V n
(
t
∣∣t1:j−1, vn ) , (45)
Hence, besides the required local randomness, only Λ(X)0
and T˜1:L[(H(n)V )C \ L(n)X|V ] are constructed randomly.
D. Decoding
Consider that (Υ(V )(k) ,Φ
(V )
(k),1:L), k ∈ [1, L], is available
to the k-th legitimate receiver. In the decoding process,
both legitimate receivers form the estimates Aˆn1:L of A˜
n
1:L
and then output the messages (Wˆ1:L, Sˆ1:L).
1) Legitimate receiver 1: This receiver forms the
estimates Aˆn1:L by going forward, i.e., from Aˆ
n
1 to Aˆ
n
L,
and this process is summarized in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 Decoding at legitimate receiver 1
Require: Υ(V )(1) , Φ
(V )
(1),1:L, κ
(V )
Θ and κ
(V )
Γ , and Y˜
n
(1),1:L.
1 Λˆ(V )1:L−1 ← Υ(V )(1)
2 Aˆn1 ←
(
Υ
(V )
(1) ,Φ
(V )
(1),1, Y˜
n
(1),1
)
3 for i = 1 to L− 1 do
4 Ψˆ(V )i ← Aˆi[C(n)2 ]
5 Γˆ(V )i ← Aˆi[C(n)1,2 ]
6 ˆ¯Θ(V )i+1 ←
(
Aˆi[R(n)1 ], Aˆi[R′(n)1,2 ]⊕ Ψˆ(V )2,i−1
)
7 Θˆ(V )i+1 ← ˆ¯Θ(V )i+1 ⊕ κ(V )Θ
8 ˆ¯Γ(V )i+1 ←
(
Aˆi[R(n)1,2 ]⊕ Γˆ(V )1,i−1, Aˆi[R′(n)1 ]
)
9 Γˆ(V )i+1 ← ˆ¯Γ(V )i+1 ⊕ κ(V )Γ
10 Πˆ(V )i ← Aˆi[I(n) ∩ G(n)2 ]
11 Υˆ′(V )(1),i+1 ←
(
Ψˆ
(V )
1,i , Γˆ
(V )
2,i , Θˆ
(V )
i+1, Γˆ
(V )
i+1, Πˆ
(V )
i , Λˆ
(V )
i
)
12 Aˆni+1 ←
(
Υˆ
′(V )
(1),i+1,Φ
(V )
(1),i+1, Y˜
n
(1),i+1
)
13 end for
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In all cases (among Case A to Case D), receiver 1
constructs Aˆn1 as follows. Given Υ
(V )
(1) (all the elements
inside the red curve at block 1 in Figures 3–6) and Φ(V )(1),1,
notice that receiver 1 knows A˜1[(L(n)V |Y(1))C]. Therefore,
from (Υ(V )(1) , Φ
(V )
(1),1) and channel observations Y˜
n
(1),1,
receiver 1 performs SC decoding for source coding
with side information [18] to form Aˆn1 . Moreover, since
Λ
(V )
1 ⊆ Υ(V )(1) has been replicated in all blocks, legitimate
receiver 1 gets Λˆ(V )1:L−1 (gray pentagons at all blocks).
For i ∈ [1, L− 1], consider the construction of Aˆni+1.
First, from Aˆni that has already been estimated, receiver 1
gets Ψˆ(V )i = Aˆi[C(n)2 ] (e.g., blue or red circles at block
1 or 2 respectively in Figures 3–6) and Γˆ(V )i = Aˆi[C(n)1,2 ]
(blue or red triangles at block 1 or 2 respectively).
Also, from Aˆni , receiver 1 obtains Θˆ
(V )
i+1 as follows. At
block 1, in all cases it gets ˆ¯Θ(V )2 = A˜1[R(n)1 ∪R′(n)1,2 ] (all
the red squares with a line through them at block 1 in
Figures 3–6). At block i ∈ [2, L−1], we distinguish two
situations. In Case D, receiver 1 gets ˆ¯Θ(V )1,i+1 = Aˆi[R(V )1 ]
(e.g., yellow squares with a line through them at block 2
in Figure 6) and Ψˆ(V )2,i−1 ⊕ ˆ¯Θ(V )2,i+1 (yellow squares with
a line through them overlapped by blue circles). Since
Ψˆ
(V )
2,i−1 ⊂ Aˆni−1 (blue circles) has already been estimated,
receiver 1 obtains ˆ¯Θ(V )2,i+1 (yellow squares with a line
through them). Otherwise, in other cases, receiver 1
obtains ˆ¯Θ(V )i+1 = Aˆi[R(n)1 ] directly (yellow squares with
a line through them at block 2 in Figures 3–5). Then,
given ˆ¯Θ(V )i+1 = [
ˆ¯Θ
(V )
1,i+1,
ˆ¯Θ
(V )
2,i+1], in all cases receiver 1
recovers the sequence Θˆ(V )i+1 =
ˆ¯Θ
(V )
i+1 ⊕ κ(V )Θ .
From Aˆni , receiver 1 also obtains Γˆ
(V )
i+1 as follows. At
block 1, in all cases it gets ˆ¯Γ(V )2 = A˜1[R(n)1,2 ∪ R′(n)1 ]
directly (e.g., all red triangles with a line through them
at block 1 in Figures 3–6). At block i ∈ [2, L − 1], in
all cases receiver 1 obtains Γˆ(V )1,i−1 ⊕ ˆ¯Γ(V )1,i+1 = A˜i[R(n)1,2 ]
(e.g., blue and yellow diamonds with a line through
them at block 2). Since Γˆ(V )1,i−1 ⊂ A˜ni−1 (blue trian-
gles) has already been estimated, receiver 1 obtains
ˆ¯Γ
(V )
1,i+1 = A˜i[R(n)1,2 ]⊕ Γˆ(V )1,i−1 (yellow triangles with a line
through them). Also, only in Case B, receiver 1 obtains
ˆ¯Γ
(V )
2,i+1 = A˜i[R′(n)1 ] (remaining yellow triangles with a
line through them at block 3 in Figure 4). Then, given
ˆ¯Γ
(V )
i+1 = [
ˆ¯Γ
(V )
1,i+1,
ˆ¯Γ
(V )
2,i+1], in all cases receiver 1 recovers
the sequence Γˆ(V )i+1 =
ˆ¯Γ
(V )
i+1 ⊕ κ(V )Γ .
Only in cases A and B, it gets Πˆ(V )i = Aˆi[I(n)∩G(n)2 ]
(e.g. purple crosses at block 2 in Figures 3–4). Let
Υ
′(V )
(1),i+1 ,
[
Ψˆ
(V )
1,i , Γˆ
(V )
2,i , Θˆ
(V )
i+1, Γˆ
(V )
i+1, Πˆ
(V )
i , Λˆ
(V )
i
]
. (46)
Notice that Υ′(V )(1),i+1 = A˜i+1[H(n)V ∩ (L(n)V |Y(1))C] (all the
elements inside red curve at block i+ 1 in Figures 3–6).
Thus, receiver 1 performs SC decoding to form Aˆni+1 by
using Υ′(V )(1),i+1, Φ
(V )
(1),i+1 and the observations Y˜
n
(1),i+1.
2) Legitimate receiver 2: This receiver forms the
estimates Aˆn1:L by going backward, i.e., from Aˆ
n
L to Aˆ
n
1 ,
and this process is summarized in Algorithm 5.
In all cases (among Case A to Case D), receiver 2
constructs AˆnL as follows. Given Υ
(V )
(2) (all the elements
inside blue curve at block 4 in Figures 3–6) and Φ(V )(2),L,
notice that receiver 2 knows A˜L[(L(n)V |Y(2))C]. Hence,
from (Υ(V )(2) , Φ
(V )
(2),L) and channel observations Y˜
n
(2),L,
receiver 2 performs SC decoding for source coding with
side information to form AˆnL. Since Λ
(V )
1 has been
replicated in all blocks, from A˜nL receiver 2 obtains
Λˆ
(V )
1:L−1 = A˜L[R(n)Λ ] (gray pentagons at all blocks).
For i ∈ [2, L], consider the construction of Aˆni−1. First,
from Aˆni that has already been estimated, legitimate
receiver 2 obtains the sequence Θˆ(V )i = A˜i[C(n)1 ] (e.g.,
cyan or yellow squares at block 4 or 3 respectively
in Figures 3–6). Given Θˆ(V )i , the encoder computes
ˆ¯Θ
(V )
i = Θˆ
(V )
i ⊕ κ(V )Θ (corresponding previous squares
with a line through them). Also, receiver 2 obtains
Γˆ
(V )
i = A˜i[C(n)1,2 ] (cyan or yellow triangles at block 4
or 3 respectively in Figures 3–6). Given this sequence,
receiver 2 computes ˆ¯Γ(V )i = Γˆ
(V )
i ⊕κ(V )Γ (corresponding
previous triangles with a line through them).
Also, from Aˆni , receiver 2 obtains Θˆ
(V )
i+1 as follows. At
block L, in all cases it gets Ψˆ(V )L−1 = A˜i[R(n)2 ∪ R′(n)1,2 ]
directly (all yellow circles at block L in Figures 3–6).
At block i ∈ [2, L−1], we distinguish two situations. In
Case D, it obtains Ψˆ(V )1,i−1 = A˜i[R(n)2 ] (e.g., red circles
at block 3 in Figure 6) and Ψˆ(V )2,i−1⊕ ˆ¯Θ(V )2,i+1 = A˜i[R′(n)1,2 ]
(cyan squares with a line through them overlapped by red
circles). Since ˆ¯Θ(V )2,i+1 (cyan squares with a line through
them) has already been estimated, receiver 2 obtains
Ψˆ
(V )
2,i−1 = A˜i[R′(n)1,2 ]⊕ ˆ¯Θ(V )2,i+1 (red circles). Otherwise, in
Algorithm 5 Decoding at legitimate receiver 2
Require: Υ(V )(2) , Φ
(V )
(2),1:L, κ
(V )
Θ and κ
(V )
Γ , and Y˜
n
(2),1:L.
1 AˆnL ←
(
Υ
(V )
(2) ,Φ
(V )
(2),L, Y˜
n
(2),L
)
2 Λˆ(V )1:L−1 ← AˆnL
3 for i = L to 2 do
4 ˆ¯Θ(V )i ← Aˆi[C(n)1 ]⊕ κ(V )Θ
5 ˆ¯Γ(V )i ← Aˆi[C(n)1,2 ]⊕ κ(V )Γ
6 Ψˆ(V )i−1 ←
(
Aˆi[R(n)2 ], Aˆi[R′(n)1,2 ]⊕ ˆ¯Θ(V )2,i+1
)
7 Γˆ(V )i−1 ←
(
Aˆi[R(n)1,2 ]⊕ ˆ¯Γ(V )1,i+1, Aˆi[R′(n)2 ]
)
8 Πˆ(V )i−1 ← Aˆi[R(n)S ]
9 Υ′(V )(2),i−1 ←
( ˆ¯Θ(V )1,i , ˆ¯Γ(V )2,i , Ψˆ(V )i−1, Γˆ(V )i−1, Πˆ(V )i−1, Λˆ(V )i−1)
10 Aˆni−1 ←
(
Υ
′(V )
(2),i−1,Φ
(V )
(2),i−1, Y˜
n
(2),i−1
)
11 end for
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other cases, receiver 2 obtains directly Ψˆ(V )i−1 = A˜i[R(n)2 ]
(e.g., red circles at block 3 in Figures 3–5).
From Aˆni , receiver 2 also obtains Γˆ
(V )
i−1 as follows. At
block L, in all cases it gets ˆ¯Γ(V )L−1 = A˜L[R(n)1,2 ∪ R′(n)2 ]
(e.g., all yellow triangles at block L in Figures 3–6).
At block i ∈ [2, L − 1], in all cases receiver 2 obtains
Γˆ
(V )
1,i−1⊕ ˆ¯Γ(V )1,i+1 = A˜i[R(n)1,2 ] (e.g., red and cyan diamonds
with a line through them at block 3). Since ˆ¯Γ(V )1,i+1 (cyan
triangles with a line through them) has already been
estimated, receiver 2 obtains Γˆ(V )1,i−1 = A˜i[R(n)1,2 ]⊕ ˆ¯Γ(V )1,i+1
(red triangles). Also, only in Case B, receiver 2 obtains
the sequence Γˆ(V )2,i−1 = A˜i[R′(n)2 ] (remaining red trian-
gles at block 3 in Figure 4).
Finally, only in Case A and Case B, receiver 2 obtains
the sequence Πˆ(V )i−1 = A˜i[RS] (e.g., purple crosses at
block 3 in Figures 3–4). Let
Υ
′(V )
(2),i−1 ,
[ ˆ¯Θ(V )1,i , ˆ¯Γ(V )2,i , Ψˆ(V )i−1, Γˆ(V )i−1, Πˆ(V )i−1, Λˆ(V )i−1]. (47)
Notice that3 Υ′(V )(2),i−1 ⊇ A˜i−1[H(n)V ∩(L(n)V |Y(2))C] (all the
elements inside blue curve at block i−1 in Figures 3–6).
Thus, receiver 2 performs SC decoding to form Aˆni−1 by
using Υ′(V )(2),i−1, Φ
(V )
(2),i−1 and Y˜
n
(2),i−1.
V. PERFORMANCE OF THE POLAR CODING SCHEME
The analysis of the polar coding scheme of Section IV
leads to the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Let (X , pY(1)Y(2)Z|X ,Y(1)×Y(2)×Z) be an
arbitrary WBC such that X ∈ {0, 1}. The polar coding
scheme described in Section IV achieves the corner point
in (4) of the region RCI-WBC defined in Proposition 1.
The proof of Theorem 1 follows in four steps and is
provided in the following subsections. In Section V-A
we show that the polar coding scheme approaches (4).
Then, in Section V-A we prove that the joint distribution
of (V˜ ni , X˜
n
i , Y˜
n
(1),i, Y˜
n
(2),i, Z˜
n
i ) is asymptotically indistin-
guishable of the one of the original DMS. Finally, in
Section V-C and Section V-D we show that the polar
coding scheme satisfies the reliability and the secrecy
conditions (1) and (2) respectively.
A. Transmission Rates
We prove that the polar coding scheme described in
Section IV approaches the rate tuple (4). Also, we show
that the overall length of the secret keys κ(V )Θ , κ
(V )
Γ ,
κ
(V )
ΥΦ(1)
and κ(V )ΥΦ(2) , and the additional randomness used
in the encoding (besides the randomization sequences)
are asymptotically negligible in terms of rate.
3We have Υ′(V )
(2),i−1 ⊇ A˜i−1[H
(n)
V ∩ (L
(n)
V |Y(2) )
C] because part of
ˆ¯Θ
(V )
1,i in cases C and D could be copied in some entries of A˜i−1[G(n)0 ].
1) Private message rate: For i ∈ [1, L], we have
Wi = A˜i[C(n)]. According to the definition of C(n) in
(13), and since H(n)V |Z ⊆ H(n)V , the rate of W1:L is
1
nL
L∑
i=1
|Wi| = 1
n
∣∣∣H(n)V ∩ (H(n)V |Z)C∣∣∣
=
1
n
∣∣H(n)V ∣∣− 1n ∣∣H(n)V |Z∣∣
n→∞−−−−→ H(V )−H(V |Z)
= I(V ;Z),
where the limit holds by [18, Theorem 1]. Therefore,
the private message rate achieved by the polar coding
scheme is RW in (4).
2) Confidential message rate: From Section IV-B, in
all cases |S1| = A˜1[I(n)G(n)1 ∪ G(n)1,2 ]; for i ∈ [2, L− 1],
Si = A˜i[I(n)]; and SL = A˜L[I(n)G(n)2 ]. Thus, we have
1
nL
L∑
i=1
|Si|
=
(L−2)∣∣I(n)∣∣+∣∣I(n)G(n)1 ∪ G(n)1,2 ∣∣+∣∣I(n) ∪ G(n)2 ∣∣
nL
=
1
n
∣∣I(n)∣∣+ 1
nL
(∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣+ ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣+ ∣∣G(n)1,2 ∣∣)
=
1
n
∣∣I(n)∣∣+ 1
nL
∣∣G(n) \ G(n)0 ∣∣
(a)
=
∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣+∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣−∣∣R(n)1,2 ∣∣−∣∣R′(n)1,2 ∣∣−∣∣R(n)1 ∣∣−∣∣R′(n)1 ∣∣
n
+
1
nL
∣∣G(n) \ G(n)0 ∣∣
(b)
=
∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣+∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣−∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣−∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣
n
+
∣∣G(n) \ G(n)0 ∣∣
nL
(c)
=
∣∣∣H(n)V |Z ∩ L(n)V |Y(1)∣∣∣− ∣∣∣(H(n)V |Z)C ∩ (L(n)V |Y(1))C∣∣∣
n
+
∣∣∣H(n)V |Z ∩ (L(n)V |Y(1) ∩ L(n)V |Y(2))C∣∣∣
nL
≥
∣∣∣H(n)V |Z ∩ L(n)V |Y(1)∣∣∣− ∣∣∣(H(n)V |Z)C ∩ (L(n)V |Y(1))C∣∣∣
n
+
∣∣∣H(n)V |Z∣∣∣− ∣∣∣(L(n)V |Y(1))C∣∣∣
nL
=
∣∣∣H(n)V |Z∣∣∣− ∣∣∣(L(n)V |Y(1))C∣∣∣
n
+
∣∣∣H(n)V |Z∣∣∣− ∣∣∣(L(n)V |Y(1))C∣∣∣
nL
n→∞−−−−→ H(V |Z)−H(V |Y(1))+
H(V |Z)−H(V |Y(1))
L
L→∞−−−−→ I(V ;Y(1))− I(V ;Z)
where (a) holds by the definition of I(n) in (32); (b)
holds because, in all cases, |R(n)1,2 |+ |R′(n)1 | = |C(n)1,2 | and
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|R(n)1 |+ |R′(n)1,2 | = |C(n)1 |, (c) follows from the partition
of H(n)V defined in (14)–(21); and the limit when n goes
to infinity holds by [18, Theorem 1]. Hence, the coding
scheme achieves the confidential message rate RS in (4).
3) Randomization sequence rate.: For i ∈ [1, L], we
have Ri = T˜i[H(n)X|V ∩ (H(n)X|V Z)C]. Therefore, we have
1
nL
L∑
i=1
|Ri| = 1
n
∣∣∣H(n)X|V ∩ (H(n)X|V Z)C∣∣∣
(a)
=
1
n
∣∣H(n)X|V ∣∣− 1n ∣∣H(n)X|V Z∣∣
n→∞−−−−→ H(X|Z)−H(X|V Z)
= I(X;Z|V ),
where (a) holds because H(n)X|V Z ⊇ H(n)X|V , and the limit
by [18, Theorem 1]. Thus, the randomization sequence
rate used by the polar coding scheme is RR in (4).
4) Privacy shared sequence rate: The transmitter and
the k-th legitimate receiver must privately share the keys
κ
(V )
Θ , κ
(V )
Γ and κ
(V )
ΥΦ(k)
. Hence, the overall rate is∣∣κ(V )Θ ∣∣+ ∣∣κ(V )Γ ∣∣+∑2k=1 ∣∣κ(V )ΥΦ(k) ∣∣
nL
=
∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣+ ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣
nL
+
2∑
k=1
L
∣∣∣(H(n)V )C∩ (L(n)V |Y(k))C∣∣∣+∣∣∣H(n)V ∩ (L(n)V |Y(k))C∣∣∣
nL
(a)
=
∣∣∣H(n)V ∩ (H(n)V |Z)C ∩ (L(n)V |Y(1))C∣∣∣
nL
+
2∑
k=1
L
∣∣∣(H(n)V )C∩ (L(n)V |Y(k))C∣∣∣+∣∣∣H(n)V ∩ (L(n)V |Y(k))C∣∣∣
nL
(b)
≤
∣∣∣(L(n)V |Y(1))C∣∣∣
nL
+
2∑
k=1
L
∣∣∣(H(n)V |Y(k))C \ L(n)V |Y(k) ∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣(L(n)V |Y(k))C∣∣∣
nL
n→∞−−−−→ 2H(V |Y(1)) +H(V |Y(2))
L
L→∞−−−−→ 0,
where (a) follows from the definition of C(n)1 and C(n)1,2
in (19) and (21) respectively; for the second term in (b)
we have used (H(n)V )C ⊆ (HV |Y(k))C; and the limit when
n goes to infinity holds by [18, Theorem 1].
5) Rate of the additional randomness: Besides the
randomization sequences R1:L, the encoder uses the
random sequence Λ(X)0 , with size |H(n)X|V |, for the polar-
based channel prefixing. Moreover, for i ∈ [1, L], the
encoder randomly draws those elements A˜i(j) such that
j ∈ (H(n)V )C \ L(n)V , and those elements T˜i(j) such that
j ∈ (H(n)X|V )C \ L(n)X|V . Nevertheless, we have∣∣∣H(n)X|V ∣∣∣+ L∣∣∣(H(n)V )C \ L(n)V ∣∣∣+ L∣∣∣(H(n)X|V )C \ L(n)X|V ∣∣∣
nL
n→∞−−−−→ H(X|V )
L
L→∞−−−−→ 0,
where the limit when n approaches to infinity follows
from applying [18, Theorem 1].
B. Distribution of the DMS after the polar encoding
For i ∈ [1, L], let q˜Ani Tni denote the distribution
of (A˜ni , T˜
n
i ) after the encoding. The following lemma
proves that q˜Ani Tni and pAnTn , the later being a marginal
of the joint distribution of the original DMS in (11),
are nearly statistically indistinguishable for sufficiently
large n and, consequently, so are q˜V ni Xni Y n(1),iY n(2),iZni and
pV nXnY n
(1)
Y n
(2)
Zn . This result is crucial for the reliability
and secrecy performance of the polar coding scheme.
Lemma 1. For i ∈ [1, L], we have
V(q˜Ani Tni , pAnTn) ≤ δ(∗)n ,
which implies
V(q˜V ni Xni Y n(1),iY n(2),iZni , pV nXnY n(1)Y n(2)Zn) ≤ δ(∗)n ,
where
δ(∗)n , 2n
√
4
√
nδn ln 2
(
2n−log (2√nδn ln 2))+δn
+2
√
nδn ln 2.
Proof. See Appendix A
C. Reliability analysis
We prove that both legitimate receivers can reliably
reconstruct the private and the confidential messages
(W1:L, S1:L) with arbitrary small error probability.
For i ∈ [1, L] and k ∈ [1, 2], let q˜V ni Y n(k),i and pV nY n(k)
be marginals of q˜V ni Xni Y n(1),iY n(2),iZni and pV nXnY n(1)Y n(2)Zn
respectively, and define an optimal coupling [21, Propo-
sition 4.7] between q˜V ni Y n(k),i and pV nY n(k) such that
P[EV ni Y n(k),i ] = V(q˜V ni Y n(k),i , pV nY n(k)),
where EV ni Y n(k),i ,
{(
V˜ ni , Y˜
n
(k),i
) 6= (V n, Y n(k))}. Addi-
tionally, define the error event
E(k),i ,
{
A˜i
[(L(n)V |Y(k))C] 6= Aˆi[(L(n)V |Y(k))C]}.
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Recall that (Υ(V )(k) ,Φ
(V )
(k),1:L) is available to the k-th
legitimate receiver. Thus, notice that we have
P[E(1),1] = P[E(2),L] = 0 (48)
because given Υ(V )(1) and Φ
(V )
(1),1 legitimate receiver 1
knows A˜1[(L(n)V |Y(1))C], and given Υ
(V )
(2) and Φ
(V )
(2),L legiti-
mate receiver 2 knows A˜L[(L(n)V |Y(2))C]. Moreover, due to
the chaining structure, in Section IV-D we have seen that
Aˆi[H(n)V ∩ (L(n)V |Y(1))C] ⊂ Aˆni−1 for i ∈ [2, L]. Therefore,
at legitimate receiver 1, for i ∈ [2, L] we obtain
P[E(1),i] ≤ P[A˜ni−1 6= Aˆni−1]. (49)
Similarly, due to the chaining construction, we have seen
that Aˆi[H(n)V ∩ (L(n)V |Y(2))C] ⊂ Aˆni+1 for i ∈ [1, L − 1].
Thus, at legitimate receiver 2, for i ∈ [1, L−1] we obtain
P[E(2),i] ≤ P[A˜ni+1 6= Aˆni+1], i ∈ [1, L− 1]. (50)
Therefore, the probability of incorrectly decoding
(Wi, Si) at the k-th receiver can be bounded as
P
[
(Wi, Si) 6= (Wˆi, Sˆi)
]
≤ P[A˜ni 6= Aˆni ]
= P
[
A˜ni 6= Aˆni
∣∣∣ECV ni Y n(k),i∩ EC(k),i]P[ECV ni Y n(k),i∩ EC(k),i]
+P
[
A˜ni 6= Aˆni
∣∣∣EV ni Y n(k),i∪E(k),i]P[EV ni Y n(k),i∪ E(k),i]
≤ P
[
A˜ni 6= Aˆni
∣∣∣ECV ni Y n(k),i∩ EC(k),i]
+P
[
EV ni Y n(k),i∪ E(k),i
]
(a)
≤ nδn + P
[EV ni Y n(k),i∪ E(k),i]
(b)
≤ nδn + P
[EV ni Y n(k),i]+ P[E(k),i]
(c)
≤ nδn + 2δ(∗)n + P
[E(k),i],
where (a) holds by [18, Theorem 2]; (b) holds by the
union bound; and (c) follows from the optimal coupling
and Lemma 1. Therefore, we have
P
[
(W1:L, S1:L) 6= (Wˆ1:L, Sˆ1:L)
]
(a)
≤
L∑
i=1
P
[
A˜ni 6= Aˆni
]
(b)
≤ L(L+ 1)
2
(
nδn + 2δ
(∗)
n
)
,
where (a) follows from applying the union bound, and
(b) holds by induction and (48)–(50).
D. Secrecy analysis
Since encoding in Section IV takes place over L
blocks of size n, we need to prove that
lim
n,L→∞
I(S1:L, Z˜
n
1:L) = 0.
For clarity and with slight abuse of notation, for any
block i ∈ [1, L] let
Ξ
(V )
i , [Π
(V )
i ,Λ
(V )
i ,Ψ
(V )
i ,Γ
(V )
i ], (51)
which denotes the entire random sequence depending on
A˜ni at block i that is repeated at block i+ 1. Also, let
Ω¯
(V )
i , [Θ¯
(V )
i , Γ¯
(V )
i ], (52)
which represents the sequence at block i that is repeated
at block i− 1. Also, we define κ(V )Ω , [κ(V )Θ , κ(V )Γ ].
A Bayesian graph describing the dependencies be-
tween all the variables involved in the coding scheme
of Section IV is given in Figure 7. Despite Γ(V )i ⊆ Ξ(V )i
and Γ¯(V )i = Γ
(V )
i ⊕ κ(V )Γ ⊆ Ω¯(V )i , we represent Ξ(V )i
and Ω¯(V )i as two independent nodes in the Bayesian
graph because, by crypto lemma [22], Γ(V )i and Γ¯
(V )
i are
statistically independent. Furthermore, for convenience,
we have considered that dependencies only take place
forward (from block i to block i+ 1), which is possible
by reformulating the encoding as follows. According to
Section IV-A, for any i ∈ [1, L] we have A˜i[C(n)i ] = Wi.
Consequently, we can write Wi , [W1,i,W2,i], where
W1,i , A˜i[C(n)1 ∪C(n)1,2 ] and W2,i , A˜i[C(n)2 ∪C(n)0 ]. Thus,
we regard Ω¯(V )i as an independent random sequence
generated at block i − 1, which is stored properly into
some part of A˜i−1[G(n)]. Then, we consider that the
encoder obtains W1,i , Ω¯(V )i ⊕ κ(V )Ω , which is stored
into A˜i[C(n)1 ∪ C(n)1,2 ]. On the other hand, the remaining
part W2,i is independently generated at block i.
Block i−2 Block i−1 Block i
W1,iW1,i−1
κ
(V )
Ω
Ω¯
(V )
iΩ¯
(V )
i−1
Ω¯
(V )
i+1
Ξ
(V )
i−2 Ξ
(V )
i−1 Ξ
(V )
i
Λ
(X)
i−2 Λ
(X)
i−1 Λ
(X)
i
W2,i
Ri
W2,i−1
Ri−1
A˜ni−1 A˜
n
i
T˜ni−1 T˜
n
i
Z˜ni−1 Z˜
n
i
Si−1 Si
Fig. 7: Graphical representation of the dependencies between
random variables involved in the polar coding scheme. In-
dependent random variables are indicated by white nodes,
whereas those that are dependent are indicated by gray nodes.
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The following lemma shows that secrecy holds for any
block i ∈ [1, L] (block-wise strong secrecy).
Lemma 2. For i ∈ [1, L] and sufficiently large n,
I
(
A˜i[H(n)V |Z ]T˜i[H(n)V |Z ]; Z˜ni
) ≤ δ(S)n
where δ(S)n , 2nδn + 2δ(∗)n
(
4n − log δ(∗)n
)
and δ(∗)n
defined as in Lemma 1.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Next, the following lemma shows that eavesdropper
observations Z˜ni are asymptotically statistically indepen-
dent of observations Z˜n1:i−1 from previous blocks.
Lemma 3. For i ∈ [1, L] and sufficiently large n,
I
(
S1:LZ˜
n
1:i−1; Z˜
n
i
) ≤ δ(S)n , (53)
where δ(S)n is defined as in Lemma 2.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Therefore, we obtain
I
(
S1:L; Z˜
n
1:L
)
(a)
= I
(
S1:L; Z˜
n
1
)
+
L∑
i=2
I
(
S1:L; Z˜
n
i
∣∣Z˜n1:i−1)
≤ I(S1:L; Z˜n1 )+ L∑
i=2
I
(
S1:LZ˜
n
1:i−1; Z˜
n
i
)
(b)
≤ (L− 1)δ(S)n + I
(
S1:L; Z˜
n
1
)
= (L− 1)δ(S)n + I
(
S1; Z˜
n
1
)
+ I
(
S2:L; Z˜
n
1
∣∣S1)
(c)
= (L− 1)δ(S)n + I
(
S1; Z˜
n
1
)
(d)
≤ Lδ(S)n
where (a) follows from applying the chain rule; (b) holds
by Lemma 3; (c) holds by independence between S2:L
and any random variable from block 1; and (d) holds by
Lemma 2 because S1 ⊆ A˜1[H(n)V |Z ].
Remark 1. We conjecture that the use κ(V )Ω is not needed
for the polar coding scheme to satisfy the strong secrecy
condition. However, the key is required in order to prove
this condition by using a causal Bayesian graph similar
to the one in Figure 7.
Remark 2. Although non-causual (backward) depen-
dencies between random variables of different blocks
appear in [12], a secret seed as κ(V )Ω is not necessary
for the polar coding scheme to provide strong secrecy.
This is because random sequences that are repeated in
adjacent blocks are stored only into those corresponding
entries whose indices belong to the “high entropy set
given eavesdropper observations”, i.e., the equivalent
sets of H(n)V |Z and H(n)X|V Z in our polar coding scheme.
By contrast, notice that our polar coding scheme stores
[Θ
(V )
i ,Γ
(V )
i ] into some part of A˜i[(H(n)V |Z)C].
Remark 3. Another possibility for the polar coding
scheme is to repeat at block i + 1 the modulo-2 ad-
dition between [Ψ(V )i ,Γ
(V )
i ] and a secret-key, instead
of repeating an encrypted version of [Θ(V )i ,Γ
(V )
i ] at
block i − 1. Then, it is not difficult to prove that
I
(
S1:LZ˜
n
i+1:L; Z˜
n
i
) ≤ δ(S)n (similar to Lemma 3). Thus,
we can minimize the length of the secret seed depending
on whether |C(n)1 | < |C(n)2 | or vice versa.
VI. CONCLUSION
A strongly secure polar coding scheme has been
proposed for the WBC with two legitimate receivers
and one eavesdropper. This polar code achieves the best
known inner-bound on the achievable region of the CI-
WBC model, where transmitter wants to send private and
confidential messages to both receivers. Due to the non-
degradedness assumption of the channel, the encoder
builds a chaining construction that induces bidirectional
dependencies between adjacent blocks. These dependen-
cies need to be taken carefully into account in the secrecy
analysis and make the use of secret seeds crucial.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
We generalize the results obtained in [20] for any
DMS (V1 × · · · × VM × O1 × · · · × OK , pV1:MO1:K )
such that V` , {0, 1} for any ` ∈ [1,M ], and pV1:MO1:K
satisfies the Markov chain condition V1 − · · · − VM −
O1:K . This DMS characterizes an encoding procedure
for the broadcast channel with K receivers (legitimate
ones or eavesdroppers), where Ok denotes the channel
output k ∈ [1,K], and V` denotes the binary encoding
input random variable ` ∈ [1,M ]. Consider an i.i.d. n-
sequence (V n1:M , O
n
1:K) of this DMS, n being any power
of two. We define the polar transforms Un1:M ∼ pUn1:M ,
where Un` , V n` Gn for any ` ∈ [1,M ], and the sets
H(n)V`|V`−1,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H(U`(j)∣∣U1:j−1` , V n`−1)
≥ 1− δn
}
,
L(n)V`|V`−1,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H(U`(j)∣∣U1:j−1` , V n`−1) ≤ δn}.
Note that the model considered in this paper can be
represented by the previous DMS if we take K , 3
(two legitimate receivers and one eavesdropper), M , 2
defining V , V1, X , V2 and the associated polar
transforms An , Un1 and Tn , Un2 .
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Consider an encoder that forms U˜n1:M with joint dis-
tribution q˜Un1:M ,
∏M
`=1
∏n
j=1 q˜U`(j)|U1:j−1` V n`−1 , where
q˜U`(j)|U1:j−1` V n`−1
(
u˜`(j)
∣∣u˜1:j−1` , v˜n`−1)
=

1
2 if j ∈ H(n)V`|V`−1 ,
pU`(j)|U1:j−1` V n`−1
(
u˜`(j)
∣∣u˜1:j−1` , v˜n`−1)
if j ∈ (H(n)V`|V`−1)C \ L(n)V`|V`−1 ,
1
{
u˜`(j) = ξ
(U`)
(j)
(
u˜1:j−1` , v˜
n
`−1
)}
if j ∈ L(n)V`|V`−1 ,
(54)
for any ` ∈ [1,M ], V n0 , ∅ and ξ(j) being the
deterministic arg max function defined as
ξ
(U`)
(j)
(
u1:j−1` , v
n
`−1
)
, arg max
u∈X
pU`(j)|U1:j−1` V n`−1
(
u`
∣∣∣u1:j−1` , vn`−1 ),
Notice that the encoder in Section IV-A constructs, for
any block i ∈ [1, L], the sequences (A˜ni , X˜ni ) with joint
distribution q˜Ani Tni defined as in (54).
Consider another encoder that omits the use of the
arg max function, but draws the corresponding elements
randomly. Let Uˇn1:M denote the sequences constructed
by this encoder. Then, their joint distribution is given by
qˇUn1:M ,
∏M
`=1
∏n
j=1 qˇU`(j)|U1:j−1` V n`−1 , where
qˇU`(j)|U1:j−1` V n`−1
(
uˇ`(j)
∣∣uˇ1:j−1` , vˇn`−1)
=

1
2 if j ∈ H(n)V`|V`−1 ,
pU`(j)|U1:j−1` V n`−1
(
uˇ`(j)
∣∣uˇ1:j−1` , vˇn`−1)
if j ∈ (H(n)V`|V`−1)C,
(55)
for any ` ∈ [1,M ], and V n0 , ∅.
The following lemma shows that the joint distributions
pUn1:M and qˇUn1:M are nearly statistically indistinguishable
for sufficiently large n.
Lemma 4. Let δn = 2−n
β
for some β ∈ (0, 12 ). Then
V(qˇUn1:M , pUn1:M ) ≤
√
Mδ(1)n ,
where δ(1)n ,
√
2nδn ln 2.
Proof. The Kullback-Leibler distance between the dis-
tributions pUn1:M and qˇUn1:M is
D
(
pUn1:M
∥∥qˇUn1:M )
(a)
=
M∑
`=1
EV n`−1D
(
pUn` |V n`−1
∥∥qˇUn` |V n`−1)
(b)
=
M∑
`=1
n∑
j=1
E
[
D
(
pU`(j)|U1:j−1` V n`−1
∥∥∥qˇU`(j)|U1:j−1` V n`−1)],
where (a) holds by the chain rule, the invertibility of
Gn and the Markov chain condition satisfied by Un1:M
and Uˇn1:M ; and (b) holds by the chain rule and by taking
the expectation with respect to (U1:j−1` , V
n
`−1). Thus, we
obtain
D
(
pUn1:M
∥∥qˇUn1:M )
(a)
=
M∑
`=1
∑
j∈H(n)
V`|V`−1
(
1−H
(
U`(j)
∣∣∣U1:j−1` , V n`−1))
(b)
≤ Mδn
∣∣H(n)V`|V`−1∣∣,
where (a) holds by (55) and [?, Lemma 10], i.e.,
D(p‖qˇ) = 1−H(p) if qˇ denotes the uniform distribution;
and (b) holds by the definition of H(n)V`|V`−1 .
Finally, we get V(qˇUn1:M , pUn1:M ) ≤
√
2Mnδn ln 2 by
Pinsker’s inequality and because |H(n)V`|V`−1 | ≤ n.
Now, the following lemma proves that the joint dis-
tributions qˇUn1:M and q˜Un1:M are nearly statistically indis-
tinguishable for n large enough.
Lemma 5. Let δn = 2−n
β
for some β ∈ (0, 12 ). Then
V(q˜Un1:M , qˇUn1:M ) ≤ δ(2)n ,
where δ(2)n , Mn
√
2
√
2δ
(1)
n
(
2n− log√2δ(1)n
)
+ δn,
and δ(1)n defined as in Lemma 4.
Proof. The proof follows similar reasoning as the one
for [20, Lemma 2]. Define a coupling [21] for Uˇn1:M and
U˜n1:M such that Uˇ`[(L(n)V`|V`−1)C] = U˜`[(L
(n)
V`|V`−1)
C] for
any ` ∈ [1,M ]. Thus, we have
V(q˜Un1:M , qˇUn1:M )
(a)
≤ P[U˜n1:M 6= Uˇn1:M ]
(b)
≤
M∑
`=1
P
[
U˜n` 6= Uˇn`
∣∣V˜ n`−1 = Vˇ n`−1]
(c)
≤
M∑
`=1
n∑
j=1
P
[
U˜`(j) 6= Uˇ`(j)
∣∣∣EUn` V n`−1]
(d)
=
M∑
`=1
∑
j∈L(n)
V`|V`−1
E(Uˇ1:j−1` ,Vˇ n`−1)
[
1− pU`(j)|U1:j−1` V n`−1
(
u∗` (j)|Uˇ1:j−1` , Vˇ n`−1
)]
,
(56)
where (a) holds by the coupling lemma [21, Proposi-
tion 4.7]; (b) by the union bound, the invertibility of Gn
and the Markov chain condition satisfied by U˜n1:M and
Uˇn1:M ; (c) also holds by the union bound and defining
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EUn` V n`−1 , {(Uˇ
1:j−1
` , Vˇ
n
`−1) = (U˜
1:j−1
` , V˜
n
`−1)}; and (d)
follows from (54) and (55) given that Uˇ`[(L(n)V`|V`−1)C] =
U˜`[(L(n)V`|V`−1)C] and from defining
u∗` (j) , arg max
u∈{0,1}
pU`(j)|U1:j−1` V n`−1(u
∣∣Uˇ1:j−1` , Vˇ n`−1).
Next, for any j ∈ [n] and sufficiently large n, we have∣∣H(U`(j)∣∣U1:j−1` , V n`−1)−H(U`(j)∣∣Uˇ1:j−1` , Vˇ n`−1)∣∣
(a)
≤
∣∣∣H(U1:j−1` , V n`−1)−H(Uˇ1:j−1` , Vˇ n`−1)∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣H(U1:j` , V n`−1)−H(U`(j), Uˇ1:j−1` , Vˇ n`−1)∣∣∣
(b)
≤ 2V(qˇU1:j−1` Un`−1 , pU1:j−1` Un`−1)
× log 2
n+j−1
V
(
qˇU1:j−1` Un`−1
, pU1:j−1` Un`−1
)
(c)
≤ 2
√
2δ(1)n
(
2n− log
√
2δ(1)n
)
(57)
where (a) holds by the chain rule of entropy and the
triangle inequality; (b) holds by [24, Lemma 2.7], the
invertibility of Gn, and because
V(pU`(j)|U1:j−1` Un`−1 qˇU1:j−1` Un`−1 , pU1:j` Un`−1)
= V(qˇU1:j−1` Un`−1 , pU1:j−1` Un`−1);
and (c) holds by Lemma 4 (taking M = 2) because
V(qˇU1:j−1` Un`−1 , pU1:j−1` Un`−1) ≤ V(qˇUn`−1:` , pU`−1:`),
x 7→ x log x is decreasing for x > 0 small enough, and
j ≤ n. Thus, for ` ∈ [1,M ] and j ∈ L(n)V`|V`−1 , we have
2
√
2δ(1)n
(
2n− log
√
2δ(1)n
)
+ δn
(a)
≥ 2
√
2δ(1)n
(
2n− log
√
2δ(1)n
)
+
+H
(
U`(j)|U1:j−1` , V n`−1
)
(b)
≥ H(U`(j)|U1:j−1` , V n`−1)
(c)
= E
[
h2
(
pU`(j)|U1:j−1` V n`−1
(
u?` (j)
∣∣Uˇ1:j−1` , Vˇ n`−1))]
≥ E
[
−
(
1− pU`(j)|U1:j−1` V n`−1
(
u?` (j)
∣∣Uˇ1:j−1` , Vˇ n`−1))
× log
(
1− pU`(j)|U1:j−1` V n`−1
(
u?` (j)
∣∣Uˇ1:j−1` , Vˇ n`−1))]
(d)
≥ E
[(
1− pU`(j)|U1:j−1` V n`−1
(
u?` (j)
∣∣Uˇ1:j−1` , Vˇ n`−1))2]
(e)
≥ E2
[(
1− pU`(j)|U1:j−1` V n`−1
(
u?` (j)
∣∣Uˇ1:j−1` , Vˇ n`−1))]
(58)
where (a) holds by the definition of L(n)V`|V`−1 ; (b) holds
by (57); in (c) the expectation is taken with respect to
(Uˇ1:j−1` , Uˇ
n
`−1) and h2(p) denotes the binary entropy
function, i.e., h2(p) = −p log p− (1− p) log(1− p); (d)
holds because pU`(j)|U1:j−1` V n`−1(u
?
` (j)|Uˇ1:j−1` , Vˇ n`−1) ≥
1/2 and log(x) < −x if x ∈ [0, 1/2); and (e) follows
from applying Jensen’s inequality.
Finally, by combining Equations (56) and (58), and
because |L(n)V`|V`−1 | ≤ n, we have
V(q˜Un1:M , qˇUn1:M )
≤Mn
√
2
√
2δ
(1)
n (2n− log
√
2δ
(1)
n ) + δn,
and the proof is complete.
Hence, by Lemma 4, Lemma 5 and by applying the
triangle inequality, we obtain
V(q˜Un1:m , pUn1:m)
≤ V(q˜Un1:M , qˇUn1:M ) + V(qˇUn1:M , pUn1:M )
≤Mn
√
2
√
2δ
(1)
n
(
2n− log
√
2δ
(1)
n
)
+ δn +
√
Mδ(1)n .
Moreover, since
V(q˜Un1:MOn1:K , pUn1:MOn1:K )
= V(q˜Un1:M pOn1:K |Un1:M , pUn1:M pOn1:K |Un1:M )
= V(q˜Un1:M , pUn1:M ),
the joint distributions pUn1:MOn1:K and qˇUn1:MOn1:K are also
nearly statistically indistinguishable for n large enough.
Additionally, we provide the following lemma, which
relates the total variation distance between q˜Un1:MOn1:K
and pUn1:MOn1:K with the corresponding entropies.
Lemma 6. Define J` as any subset of [1, n], where
` ∈ [1,M ]. Let (Un1:M , On1:K) ∼ pUn1:MOn1:K and
(U˜n1:M , O˜
n
1:K) ∼ q˜Un1:MOn1:K such that the total variation
distance V
(
pUn1:MOn1:K , q˜U1:MOn1:K
) ≤ δ, where δ → 0.
Then, for sufficiently large n, we have∣∣H(U˜1[J1] . . . U˜M [JM ]O˜n1:K)
−H(U1[J1] . . . UM [JM ]On1:K)∣∣
≤ (M +K + 1)nδ − δ log δ.
Proof. From applying [24, Lemma 2.7], we obtain∣∣H(U˜1[J1] . . . U˜M [JM ]O˜n1:K)
−H(U1[J1] . . . UM [JM ]On1:K)∣∣
≤ V(pU1[J1]...T [JM ]On1:K , q˜U1[J1]...UM [JM ]On1:K)
× log 2
n+
∑M
`=1 |J`|+Kn
V
(
pU1[J1]...T [JM ]On1:K , q˜U1[J1]...UM [JM ]On1:K
)
≤ (M +K + 1)nδ − δ log δ,
where the last inequality holds by assumption, because
the function x 7→ x log x is decreasing for x > 0 small
enough, and because |J`| ≤ n for any ` ∈ [1,M ].
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
We prove that A˜i[H(n)V |Z ] and A˜i[H(n)X|V Z ] are asymp-
totically jointly independent of eavesdropper channel
observations Z˜ni . To do so, we use the following lemma.
First, for any i ∈ [1, L] and n large enough,∣∣∣H(A˜i[H(n)V |Z ]T˜i[H(n)X|V Z ]∣∣Z˜ni )
−H(A[H(n)V |Z ]T [H(n)X|V Z ]∣∣Zn)∣∣∣
(a)
≤
∣∣∣H(A˜i[H(n)V |Z ]T˜i[H(n)X|V Z ]Z˜ni )
−H(A[H(n)V |Z ]T [H(n)X|V Z ]Zn)∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣H(Z˜ni )−H(Zn)∣∣∣
(b)
≤ 8nδ(∗)n − 2δ(∗)n log δ(∗)n , (59)
where (a) follows from applying the chain rule of
entropy and the triangle inequality; and (b) holds by
Lemma 6 and Lemma 1 because
V
(
pZn , q˜Zni
)
≤ V(p
A[H(n)
V |Z ]T [H
(n)
X|V Z ]Z
n , q˜Ai[H(n)V |Z ]Ti[H
(n)
X|V Z ]Z
n
i
)
≤ V(q˜V ni Xni Y n(1),iY n(2),iZni , pV nXnY n(1)Y n(2)Zn)
≤ δ(∗)n .
Therefore, we have
I
(
A˜i[H(n)V |Z ]T˜i[H(n)V |Z ]; Z˜ni
)
(a)
=
∣∣H(n)V |Z∣∣+ ∣∣H(n)X|V Z∣∣−H(A˜i[H(n)V |Z ]T˜i[H(n)V |Z ]∣∣Z˜ni )
(b)
≤ ∣∣H(n)V |Z∣∣+ ∣∣H(n)X|V Z∣∣−H(A[H(n)V |Z ]T [H(n)X|V Z ]∣∣Zn)
+2δ(∗)n (4n− log δ(∗)n )
(c)
≤ 2nδn + 2δ(∗)n (4n− log δ(∗)n ),
where (a) holds by the definition of mutual information
in terms of entropies and the uniformity of A˜i[H(n)V |Z ]
and T˜i[H(n)V |Z ]; (b) holds by (59); and (c) holds because
H
(
A[H(n)V |Z ]T [H(n)X|V Z ]
∣∣Zn)
≥ H(A[H(n)V |Z ]∣∣Zn)+H(T [H(n)X|V Z ]∣∣AnZn)
≥
∑
j∈H(n)
V |Z
H
(
A(j)
∣∣A1:j−1Zn)
+
∑
j∈H(n)
X|V Z
H
(
T (j)
∣∣T 1:j−1V nZn)
≥ ∣∣H(n)V |Z∣∣(1− δn) + ∣∣H(n)X|V Z∣∣(1− δn)
where we have used the fact that conditioning does not
increase entropy, the invertibility of Gn, and the defini-
tion of H(n)V |Z and H(n)X|V Z in (6) and (10) respectively.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
We prove that all confidential messages and eaves-
dropper observations from blocks 1 to i − 1, that is,
(S1:L, Z˜
n
1:i−1), are asymptotically statistically indepen-
dent of eavesdropper observations Z˜ni at block i.
For any i ∈ [2, L] and sufficiently large n, we have
I
(
S1:LZ˜
n
1:i−1; Z˜
n
1:i
)
= I
(
S1:iZ˜
n
1:i−1; Z˜
n
i
)
+ I
(
Si+1:L; Z˜
n
i
∣∣S1:iZ˜n1:i−1)
(a)
= I
(
S1:iZ˜
n
1:i−1; Z˜
n
i
)
≤ I(S1:iZ˜n1:i−1Ξ(V )i−1Λ(X)i−1; Z˜ni )
= I
(
SiΞ
(V )
i−1Λ
(X)
i−1; Z˜
n
i
)
+I
(
S1:i−1Z˜n1:i−1; Z˜
n
i
∣∣SiΞ(V )i−1Λ(X)i−1)
(b)
≤ δ(S)n + I
(
S1:i−1Z˜n1:i−1; Z˜
n
i
∣∣SiΞ(V )i−1Λ(X)i−1)
≤ δ(S)n + I
(
S1:i−1Z˜n1:i−1; Z˜
n
i W1,i
∣∣SiΞ(V )i−1Λ(X)i−1)
= δ(S)n + I
(
S1:i−1Z˜n1:i−1;W1,i
∣∣SiΞ(V )i−1Λ(X)i−1)
+I
(
S1:i−1Z˜n1:i−1; Z˜
n
i
∣∣SiΞ(V )i−1Λ(X)i−1W1,i)
(c)
= δ(S)n + I
(
S1:i−1Z˜n1:i−1;W1,i
∣∣SiΞ(V )i−1Λ(X)i−1)
≤ δ(S)n + I
(
A˜n1:i−1Z˜
n
1:i−1;W1,i
∣∣SiΞ(V )i−1Λ(X)i−1)
= δ(S)n + I
(
A˜n1:i−1;W1,i
∣∣SiΞ(V )i−1Λ(X)i−1)
+I
(
Z˜n1:i−1;W1,i
∣∣A˜n1:i−1SiΞ(V )i−1Λ(X)i−1)
(d)
= δ(S)n + I
(
A˜n1:i−1;W1,i
∣∣SiΞ(V )i−1Λ(X)i−1)
(e)
= δ(S)n + I
(
A˜n1:i−1; Ω¯
(V )
i ⊕ κ(V )Ω
∣∣SiΞ(V )i−1Λ(X)i−1)
(f)
= δ(S)n
where (a) holds by independence between Si+1:L
and any random variable from blocks 1 to i; (b)
holds by Lemma 2 because (Si,Ξ
(V )
i−1) is stored into
A˜i[H(n)V |Z ] and Λ(X)i−1 = T˜i[H(n)X|V Z ]; (c) follows from
applying d-separation [23] over the Bayesian graph in
Figure 7 to obtain that Z˜ni and (S1:i−1, Z˜
n
1:i−1) are
conditionally independent given (Si,Ξ
(V )
i−1,Λ
(X)
i−1,W1,i);
(d) also follows from applying d-separation to ob-
tain that W1,i and Z˜n1:i−1 are conditionally indepen-
dent given (A˜n1:i−1, Si,Ξ
(V )
i−1,Λ
(X)
i−1); (e) holds by defi-
nition; and (f) holds because Ω¯(V )i is independent of
(Si,Ξ
(V )
i−1,Λ
(X)
i−1) and any random variable from blocks
1 to i− 2 and, moreover, because by crypto-lemma [22]
we have Ω¯(V )i ⊕ κ(V )Ω independent of A˜ni−1.
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